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INTRODUCTION to Diagrams in Mathematics :  History and Phi losophy , special 
issue of Synthese , edited by John Mumma, Marco Panza and Gabriel Sandu  
Diagrams are ubiquitous in mathematics. From the most elementary class to the most 
advanced seminar, in both introductory textbooks and professional journals, diagrams are 
present, to introduce concepts, increase understanding, and prove results. They thus fulfill a 
variety of important roles in mathematical practice. Long overlooked by philosophers 
focused on foundational and ontological issues, these roles have come to receive attention in 
the past two decades, a trend in line with the growing philosophical interest in actual 
mathematical practice. Seminal contributions include the historical/philosophical analysis of 
diagrams in Euclid’s geometry offered by Ken Manders in his 1995 paper, the logical studies 
of diagrammatic reasoning contained in Gerard Allwein and Barwise’s 1996 compilation, and 
Netz’s historical study on the place of diagrams in Greek geometry1.  
These works exhibit a broad range of intellectual perspectives. To bring people from 
these separate perspectives together, two workshops devoted to the history and philosophy 
of diagrams in mathematics were jointly organized by Departments of Philosophy and 
Classics at the University of Stanford, and REHSEIS (a research center of the CNRS and the 
University of Paris 7). The first workshop was held at Stanford in the fall of 2008, the 
second in Paris in the fall of 2009. The present special issue is the direct result of these 
workshops. 
Because of the central position of Euclid’s geometry, in both the history and philosophy 
of mathematics, as well as mathematics education, the diagrams of Euclid’s geometry have 
been a major topic in the recent research on diagrams in mathematics. This is reflected in the 
make-up of the issue. Part I, which contains over half of the contributions to the issue, 
concerns Euclidean diagrams, addressing either their place and nature in the manuscript 
tradition, their role in Euclid’s geometry, or their relevance to early modern philosophy and 
mathematics. The contributions of part II examine mathematical diagrams in more modern 
and/or advanced settings.  
The content of the issue is then as follows. 
I. Euclidean Diagrams 
I.a  DIAGRAMS IN THE MANUSCRIPT TRADITION OF THE ELEMENTS  
Ken Saito, Traditions of the diagram, tradition of the text : a case study 
Gregg De Young, Mathematical diagrams from manuscript to print: Examples from the Arabic 
Euclidean Transmission 
I.b  ACCOUNTING FOR THE ROLE OF DIAGRAMS IN EUCLID’S GEOMETRY 
Marco Panza, The Twofold Role of Diagrams in Euclid's Plane Geometry 
John Mumma, Constructive Geometrical Reasoning and Diagrams 
Annalisa Coliva, Human diagrammatic reasoning and seeing-as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 Cf. K. Manders, “The Euclidean diagram (1995)”, in P. Mancosu (ed), The Philosophy of Mathematical 
Practice, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008, pp. 80-133; G. Allwein and J. Barwise (eds), 
Logical Reasoning with Diagrams, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996; R. Netz. The Shaping of 
Deduction in Greek Mathematics. A Study in Cognitive History. Cambridge U. P., Cambridge, New York, 
Melbourne, 1999. The date of publication of Manders’ paper is misleading. Though it was not 
published until 2008, it was written in 1995 and widely circulated, and became highly influential as a 
manuscript. 
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Sun-Joo Shin, The Forgotten Individual: Diagrammatic Reasoning in Mathematics 
I.c  BEYOND EUCLID 
Graciela De Pierris, Hume on Space, Geometry, and Diagrammatic Reasoning 
Katherine Dunlop, The Mathematical Form of Measurement and the Argument for Proposition I in 
Newton’s Principia 
Michael Friedman, Kant on Geometry and Spatial Intuition 
II. Diagrams in Mathematics, Logic and Linguistics 
II.a  DIAGRAMS AND DIAGRAMMATIC REASONING IN MATHEMATICS AND LOGIC: 18TH-19TH 
CENTURY 
Dominique Tournes, Diagrams in the Theory of Differential Equations (18th-19th centuries) 
Danielle Macbeth, Diagrammatic Reasoning in Frege’s Begriffsschrift 
Ivahn Smadja, Local Axioms in Disguise: Hilbert on Minkowski Diagrams 
II.b  USING DIAGRAMS IN MODERN MATHEMATICS AND LINGUISTIC 
Solomon Feferman, And so on… 
Brice Halimi, Diagrams as Sketches 
Arancha San Ginés, Seeing the language: A diagrammatic approach to natural discourse 
In the remainder of the present introduction, we briefly describe the content of these papers. 
The two articles included in section I.a are devoted to geometric diagrams in the manuscript 
tradition of ancient Greek texts. As Saito points out in the beginning of his article, the 
diagrams we find in modern versions of ancient Greek mathematical texts are far from 
representative of those appearing in the manuscripts from preceding centuries. These 
manuscripts result from various scribal traditions that exhibit various practices in the 
production of diagrams. The general aim of both Saito’s article and Greg De Young’s is to 
illuminate significant features of such practices. 
Saito’s concern is with how the diagrams of the manuscript tradition relate to the 
geometrical content of the arguments they accompany. They often satisfy conditions not 
stipulated to hold (e.g. by instantiating a parallelogram as a square) or alternatively 
misrepresent conditions stipulated or proven to hold (e.g. by depicting angles stipulated as 
equal as clearly unequal). There are, further, notable features with the diagrams representing 
reductio ad absurdam arguments, and the diagrams representing arguments that range over 
many cases. Saito examines the different manuscript traditions in these respects with a case 
study of the manuscript diagrams that accompany two propositions in book III of Euclid’s 
Elements.  
De Young focuses on a specific manuscript tradition. He explores the basic 
“architecture” (i.e. the relation of diagrams with white space and text) of medieval 
manuscripts and early printed editions of Euclidean geometry in the Arabic transmission. 
Many features of Euclidean diagrams remain constant through a long transmission history, 
although differences in scribal abilities exist. Yet there also seems to be a degree of freedom 
to adapt diagrams to the architectural context. Adaptation to print brings subtle changes, 
such as title pages, page numbers, and fully pointed text. The demands of a long-held 
calligraphic aesthetic ideal and the necessity to compete against traditional manuscripts 
within the educational marketplace combined to favor the use of lithography over 
typography in Arabic printed geometry. 
The articles included in section I.b all share the general goal of deepening our 
philosophical understanding of the diagrams of Euclid’s geometry. In his paper, Marco 
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Panza advances an account where geometric diagrams are fundamental to Euclid’s plane 
geometry in fixing what the objects of the theory are. Specifically for Panza geometric 
diagrams perform two indispensable theoretical roles. First, they provide the identity 
conditions for the objects referred to in Euclid’s propositions; second, they provide the basis 
via their concrete properties and relations for the attribution of certain properties and 
relations to these objects. After explicating this conception in general terms, Panza 
demonstrates what it amounts to vis-à-vis the Elements with a detailed and thorough analysis 
of the definitions and the first 12 propositions of book I. 
A consequence of Panza’s account is that Euclid’s geometry is in a sense a constructive 
theory. It does not concern a pre-existing domain of objects, but instead objects brought 
into existence by the constructions of geometers. The issue of John Mumma’s paper is the 
extent to which such an interpretation of Euclid can be given in formal terms. At the center 
of his discussion is a proof system he developed where Euclid’s diagrams are formalized as 
part of the system’s syntax. Mumma argues that his formalization is superior to others in 
accounting for the spatial character of the theory’s constructions. It is not immediate, 
however, that the resulting picture of the theory qualifies as a constructive one. Mumma 
closes the article by pointing to the philosophical work that is needed for it to be understood 
as such.  
A prima facie feature of the diagram based reasoning of Euclid’s geometry is that 
perception is involved in a distinctive and essential way. But how is it so involved? The 
purpose of Annalisa Coliva’s paper is to develop the philosophical concepts necessary to 
address the question. The key concept for Coliva, as the title of her paper indicates, is that of 
seeing-as. A segment joining opposite vertices of a square in a diagram can, for instance, be 
seen as a diagonal of the square, or the side of a triangle composing the square. Coliva 
articulates seeing-as as philosophically sharp notion, and argues that the ability is required to 
engage in diagram based geometric reasoning. She also offers some initial thoughts on how 
her analysis bears on the status of geometrical knowledge with respect to the a priori vs. a 
posteriori and analytic vs. synthetic distinctions.  
In her paper, Sun-Joo Shin considers Euclid’s diagrammatic arguments in order to 
examine commonly held views on the strengths and weaknesses of diagrams in comparison 
with symbolic/linguistic representations—namely the views that the latter are superior for 
giving proofs and the former are superior for brainstorming and discovery. Shin relates the 
first view to Locke and Berkeley’s opposing accounts of the generality of Euclid’s proofs, 
and argues that Berkeley’s account offers a way for understanding diagrams as a legitimate 
means for general proofs. She proposes that a major reason behind the second view, aptly 
illustrated by Euclid’s proofs, is that diagrammatic representations of individual 
mathematical objects are effective in generating the right associations and connections with 
what is already known.   
Section I.c contains papers that explore how the diagrammatic method of Euclid’s 
geometry influenced and/or was interpreted by thinkers in the early modern period. Though 
mathematics was pushing far beyond classical Greek geometry in this period, Euclid’s 
Elements nevertheless maintained its position as a foundational text and thus formed part of 
the intellectual context in which philosophical or methodological reflections on mathematics 
were carried out.  
Such reflections in Hume’s Treatise form the subject of Graciela De Pierris’s paper. In part 
II of Book I of the Treatise Hume asserts that perceivable yet indivisible minima compose 
geometric continua, but do so in a confused manner. Consequently, for Hume, geometry 
does not possess the exactness of arithmetic, which concerns clearly distinct discrete 
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quantities. De Pierris argues that these doctrines follow in a principled way from an 
epistemological model in which phenomenologically given sensory images are fundamental. 
She also explains how Euclid’s geometry for Hume, despite its relative inexactitude, qualifies 
as a demonstrative science in being based on simple, easily surveyable diagrams.  
In her paper, Katherine Dunlop explores the role of diagrams in Newton’s Principia by 
considering Newton's claim that the reasoning of the book is distinctively geometrical. She 
notes that Newton conceives geometry as the science of measurement, and argues that his 
characterization applies to the propositions of Section II, Book I. As other scholars have 
noted, these constitute a foundation in the sense that they show certain spatial quantities to 
be related as measures to nonspatial quantities, in particular, force and time. Dunlop takes 
Newton's point to be that the measures he supplies can be manipulated in the same way as 
elements of diagrams in classical geometry. In the case she examines in detail, Newton's 
proof of Kepler's area law, the principal measure of time is just the diagrammed trace of an 
inertial motion. Dunlop contends that Newton aims to share in geometry's certainty by 
resting determinations of equality and relative size (between nonspatial magnitudes) on 
relationships that are open to sensory inspection. 
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant often illustrates his claims with geometric proofs from 
Euclid’s Elements. One thus might look to recent work on the diagrammatic character of 
these proofs to gain a better understanding of Kant’s philosophy of geometry. In his article, 
Michael Friedman argues that such a project would be misdirected. He argues specifically 
that Kant’s notion of a schema for geometrical concepts and his distinction between pure 
and empirical intuition precludes a diagrammatic interpretation of his theory of geometrical 
intuition. Such an interpretation would fail, for Friedman, to explain why Kant takes the 
constructions of Euclid’s geometry to provide an a priori framework for empirical space. 
Friedman relates these points to Kant’s theory of space, and the role of geometry and spatial 
intuition in the transcendental deduction of the categories.  
Dominque Tournes’s paper, the first of section II.a, serves nicely as bridge between the 
papers of part I and those of part II. In the article Tournes provides a survey of the changing 
role of diagrams in the history of differential equations from the 17th century—when there 
were still vestiges of the diagrammatic approach of Euclid’s geometry—up until the time of 
Poincaré—when the influence of Euclid on mathematics was entirely absent. The article is a 
useful resource for those interested in understanding diagrams in mathematical subjects that 
are not ostensibly or exclusively geometrical in content.  
The other contributions of section II.a examine diagrams in the thought and work of two 
giant figures in the history and philosophy of modern mathematics.  
Danniele Macbeth’s proposes a new way of reading Frege’s logical notation, as a sort of 
diagrammatic language within which to exhibit the contents of concepts. Taking Frege’ s 
proof of theorem 133 in Part III of his 1879 treatise Begriffsschrift as an illustrative example, 
Macbeth aims to show just how a proof in Frege’ s language (so read) can extend our 
knowledge despite being strictly deductive. 
In his paper, Ivahn Smadja seeks to clarify how Hilbert understood the relative position 
of diagrams and axioms in mathematics. An easy, and overly simplistic, characterization of 
Hilbert on the issue would be just to attribute to him the view the view Shin examines in her 
contribution—i.e. diagrams belong to the realm of heuristics and discovery while axiomatics 
belong to the separate realm of justification. That it would be overly simplistic is revealed by 
Smadja’s study of the connections between the diagrams found in Minkowski’s work in 
number theory and Hilbert’s work in the foundations of geometry. Smadja specifically 
describes the links the former have to Hilbert’s axiomatic investigations of the notion of a 
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straight line, and Hilbert’s concern with the conceptual compatibility of geometry and 
arithmetic. 
The papers included in section II.c, the last group of papers, concern contemporary 
mathematics and linguistics. At the heart of Solomon Feferman’s discussion are infinite 
diagrams for the proofs of central theorems in set theory, model theory and homological 
algebra. The diagrams are infinite in the sense that they depict infinitely iterated 
constructions. Feferman contends that they are more or less essential for understanding and 
accepting the proofs, and considers whether this serves as evidence against the so-called 
formalizability thesis: the idea that all mathematical proofs admit of formalization. He argues 
for the conclusion that it does not in the light of recent discussions of the formalizability 
thesis. 
Sketch theory, a mathematical theory that treats the diagrams of category theory as 
mathematical objects, is the topic of Brice Halimi’s paper. Halimi presents a technically 
sophisticated discussion of the theory in order to bring out its relevance to a variety of 
philosophical and foundational issues. These are: the capacity of a mathematical diagram (in 
category theory and elsewhere) to represent not just a static object but also the dynamics of a 
proof; the role and nature of diagrams within category theory; and the alternative ways 
category theory and set theory provide a semantics for mathematics. 
A general point of many of the papers discussed so far is that diagrams can have 
important theoretical functions within mathematics. Arancha San Gines’s paper provides 
evidence that the same is true in linguistics, in the most direct way possible. In it she presents 
a diagrammatic account of the role anaphoric pronouns in natural discourse. The account, 
specifically, is a diagrammatic system of representation for sentences containing such 
pronouns. After motivating and describing the system, she shows how it accounts for a 
variety of linguistic phenomena that have so far resisted uniform treatment.  
John Mumma & Marco Panza 
Stanford, Paris, May 2011 
